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INTRODUCTION

The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (the Act or ICWA)' is a
federal act that provides standards for foster care, adoptive, and other

1. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923 (1994) [hereinafter the Act
or ICWA].
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child placement proceedings involving Indian children.2 The Act was
passed to give Indian tribes more control of child placement proceedings involving their members and to reduce the destructive effects on
tribes brought on by the removal of Indian children from their
culture.'
These goals are accomplished with several provisions
including jurisdictional, notice, and placement requirements.4 A
critical provision of the Act requires that adoptive placements occur in
an Indian home unless "good cause" is shown for a placement in a
non-Indian home.5
In 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the Act's good
cause exception in an adoption proceeding by a non-Indian couple6
wishing to adopt three Indian children. In In re the Custody of S.E.G.,
the court put forth a narrow standard for good cause that makes it very
difficult for a non-Indian to adopt an Indian child. While commending the goals of the Act, this Comment criticizes the court's decision
in this case. The supreme court, reversing well-reasoned trial court
and appellate court decisions, made it almost impossible for a nonIndian family to show good cause to adopt an Indian child.
Part II of this Comment looks at the historical background and
relevant provisions of the Act. It also examines a report by the
Minnesota Supreme Court's Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial

2.

See, e.g., ICWA § 1915 (stating the Act's adoption and foster care provisions).

3. ICWA §§ 1901-02.
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "[situdies
undertaken by the Association on American Indian Affairs in 1969 and 1974. . . showed
that 25 to 35% of all Indian children had been separated from their families and placed
in adoptive families, foster care, or institutions." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989) (emphasis added). Congress believed that this
separation of children from their tribes was destructive to the tribes because "there is
no resource that is more vital to the continued existence of Indian tribes than their
children .... " ICWA § 1901(3).
4. See, e.g., ICWA §§ 1911, 1912, 1915 (relating to the Act's jurisdictional, notice,
and placement provisions). These provisions accomplish the goals of giving tribes more
control over child placement proceedings and of reducing the destructive effect that
removing Indian children from their culture has on tribes. For example, the
jurisdiction provisions normally give tribes exclusive jurisdiction over child custody
proceedings involving Indian children residing or domiciled within the tribe's
reservation.
ICWA § 1911(a).
The tribe also has transfer of jurisdiction and
intervention rights in the case of foster care placement or termination of parental rights
proceedings involving Indian children. ICWA § 1911(b), (c). Another provision
requires notice to the tribe for foster care placements and terminations of parental
rights "[i]n any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where.., an Indian child is
involved." ICWA § 1912 (a). Also, the placement provisions normally require placement
with Indian families or in foster homes licensed, approved, or specified by the tribe or
in institutions approved by the tribe or operated by Indian organizations. ICWA § 1915.
5. ICWA § 1915(a).
6. In re the Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 935 (1995).
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System, which found that serious problems associated with the
placement of Indian children in Minnesota still exist. Part III discusses
the facts of the case and the trial, appellate, and supreme court
decisions. Part IV analyzes the supreme court's holdings. It criticizes
the supreme court opinion for the court's mishandling of the facts and
application of the law. Part IV concludes by presenting an alternative
approach which more evenly balances the interests of the children in
this case with those of the children's tribe.
II.
A.

THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978

History of the Act

Over the course of this century, United States Indian policy has gone
through four major periods:7 (1) the assimilation period (18711934);8 (2) the Indian Reorganization Act period (1934-1940);' (3)
the termination period (1940-1962);'o and (4) the current, selfdetermination period (1962-present).
During these periods, United
States policy shifted back and forth between absorbing Indian culture
(the assimilation and termination periods), and giving tribes greater
powers over their affairs (the Indian Reorganization Act and selfdetermination periods) .2
The assimilation period started with the passage of federal law which
ended formal treaty making with Indian tribes.13 Another statutory
change during this period gave federal courts jurisdiction for the first
time over intratribal affairs.' 4 Other attempts at assimilation included
the criminalization of many Indian cultural and religious practices,' 5

7. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, 147-64 (3d ed. 1991)
(describing the history of federal Indian policy during the periods); cf. JAMES E.
FALKOWSKI, INDIAN LAw/RACE LAW: A FIVE-HUNDRED YEAR HISTORY, 109-14 (1992)

(giving another perspective on these periods).
8.

CLINTON ET AL., supranote

7, at 147-52.

9. Id. at 152-55.
10. Id. at 155-58.
11. Id. at 158-64.
12. See, e.g., Stan Watts, Note, Voluntary Adoptions Under the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978: Balancing the Interests of Children, Families, and Tribes, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 219
(1989) (noting the inconsistency of policy during the four periods).
13. Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566, (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 71).
14. Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 1153) (allowing federal courts to have jurisdiction over certain crimes
committed by Indians on reservations).
15. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 151 (describing the Code of Indian Offenses,
a regulatory scheme never explicitly authorized by statute, which proscribed traditional
practices such as the destruction of a decedent's property, tribal dances, and payments
to a woman's family upon marriage).
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and a policy of dividing communally held tribal land into individually
owned parcels under the Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887
(DGAA). 16 The result of the DGAA was a significant dispossession
of
7
Indians from tribal land which had been reduced by two-thirds.
Concern over the direction of Indian policy brought about passage
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA)." This legislation
ended the DGAA's allotment of Indian held land into the hands of
individuals. 9 Keeping with the policy of giving Indian tribes more
autonomy, the IRA also stated that "[a]ny Indian tribe, or
tribes ...

shall have the right to organize for its common welfare, and

may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws .
"..
20 Tribes
were also given the power to create charters of incorporation for tribal
business corporations.2' The IRA was arguably successful in giving
Indian tribes more autonomy: within twelve years of passage, 161
constitutions and 131 corporate charters were adopted.22
A shift in policy away from protecting Indian autonomy started even
before full implementation of the IRA.23 During the 1940s, when
what is known as the termination period began, several statutes were
passed which gave certain states jurisdiction over particular tribes
within those states.24 In 1953, Congress passed House Concurrent
Resolution 108 (HCR 108), which called for a large number of tribes
to be "freed from Federal supervision and control and from all
disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians."25 Afterwards, Congress enacted separate statutes giving certain states
jurisdiction over individual tribes.26 By 1962, about 109 tribes had
16. Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-58) [hereinafter DGAA]; see also CLINTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 148-51
(describing the passage and implementation of the DGAA).
17. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 152.
18.

Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C.

§§ 461-79) [hereinafter IRA].
19. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 153.
20. IRA § 16 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 476).
21.

IRA § 17 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 477).

22. Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70
MICH. L. REv. 955, 972 (1972), excerpted in CLINTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 360.
23. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 155.
24. Id. at 157 (citing legislation affecting tribes in California, Iowa, North Dakota,
Kansas, and New York).
25. Id. at 157-58 (quoting Congress' language).
26. Id. at 158. During this period, Congress also enacted what is commonly known
as Public Law 280 (PL 280). Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, §§ 2,
4, 67 Stat. 589, 590 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1620 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360). PL 280 gave
Minnesota, and four other states (Alaska was added after it gained statehood),
jurisdiction over criminal matters and civil causes of action involving Indians. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1620 (1994) (criminal matters); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994) (civil causes of action). See
also Peter W. Gorman & Michelle Therese Paquin, A Minnesota Lawyer's Guide to the
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been terminated from federal supervision, from eligibility for federal
benefits, and from coverage under federal Indian laws. 7 These tribes
thus28 became fully subjected to state authority and lost their autonomy.

Support for the policies of the termination period diminished in the
1960's.2' The beginning of the self-determination period saw an end
to the implementation of HCR 108.30 In 1968, Congress passed the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), which contained provisions
requiring tribal consent for future state court acquisition ofjurisdiction
over tribes and allowed states to relinquish previously acquired
jurisdiction over tribes."' President Nixon continued the shift in the
direction of self-determination by stating a policy of strengthening
tribal sovereignty and of ending the termination of tribes."
In 1978, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act."3 Congress
heard considerable testimony before passage about the inequitable
treatment of Indian as compared with non-Indian children. 4 The

Indian Child Welfare Act, 10 LAW & INEQ. J. 311, 347-48 (1992) (explaining PL 280's
relationship to the ICWA); Lynn Klicker Uthe, Note, The Best Interests ofIndian Children
in Minnesota, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 237, 239-40 (1992) (giving a background to the
passage of PL 280).

27. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 158.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 158-59.
30. Id. at 159 (quoting Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior during the
Kennedy administration, as saying that HCR 108 had "died with the 83rd Congress and
is of no legal effect at the present time").
31. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41).
32. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for
Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
33. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-23 (1994)).
34. H.R. REP. NO. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1978) reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.CAN. 7530, 7531 [hereinafter 1978 HOUSE REPORT]; see also Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,33-37 (1989) (discussing an extensive amount
of the relevant testimony behind the Act). Several articles have been written on different aspects of the Act that give a good background on the passage of the act. See, e.g.,
Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing IndianFamily Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69
N.D. L. REv. 465, 467-68 (1993) (arguing against a judicially created exception to the
applicability of the Act when an Indian child has not previously been a part of an
existing Indian family); Gorman & Paquin, supra note 26, at 314-17 (providing a guide
to the application of the Act in light of relevant Minnesota law, federal and state
regulations, and threshold issues); Uthe, supra note 26, at 240-42 (praising the Act's
emphasis on an Indian child's cultural identity and the adherence to the Act by
Minnesota's legislature and courts); Diane Allbaugh, TribalJurisdiction Over Indian
Children:Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 533,
536-37 (1991) (analyzing a U.S. Supreme Court decision interpreting portions of the
Act); Ester C. Kim, Comment, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield: The
Contemplation of All, the Best Interests of None, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 763-65 (1991)
(presenting a negative analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court decision); Watts, supra note
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testimony showed that Indian children were removed from their
families at alarmingly high rates and were usually placed in non-Indian
homes.3" For example, during the early 1970s in Minnesota, one in
eight Indian children was in an adoptive home and approximately
ninety percent of Indian placements were in non-Indian homes.3 6
The Act was passed partly because "[t]he wholesale separation of
Indian children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and
destructive aspect of American Indian life today.""' According to
testimony before Congress, the separation of Indian children from
their culture subjected these children to serious adjustment problems
caused by growing up in a white culture that was not willing to accept
them as part of that culture.3" In addition, the tribes themselves
suffered because "the chances for Indian survival are significantly
reduced if [Indian] children, the only real means for the transmission
of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in
non-Indian homes and denied
39
exposure to the ways of their People."
B.

Relevant Provisions of the Act

The ICWA was enacted
to protect the best interest of Indian children and to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federalstandardsfor the removal of Indian children

from their families and the placement of such children in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture
40

Implicit in this language is the idea that achieving the best interests of
an Indian child is consistent with the application of the Act's "mini-

12 at 220-24 (proposing a model that allows adoption by non-Indian families in
voluntary placements and that maintains the Indian child's cultural identity).
35. 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 34, at 9. Minnesota was one of the states
specifically criticized for its child placement practices. See Gorman & Paquin, supra note
34 at 315 (noting also that Minnesota may have kept better statistics than other states).
36. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 33 (1989) (citing
Indian Child Welfare Program,HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate
Committee on Interior and InsularAffairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 75-83 (1974) [hereinafter
1974 Senate Hearings]). The U.S. Supreme Court also pointed out that "[tlhe adoption
rate of Indian children was eight times that of non-Indian children." Id.; cf Allbaugh,
supra note 34 at 537 n.23 (showing an Indian adoption rate of approximately four times
that of non-Indians in Minnesota).
37. 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 34, at 9 (quoting 1974 Senate Hearings, supra
note 36 at 3 (statement of William Byler)).
38. 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 36, at 46.
39. 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 34, at 193.
40. ICWA § 1902 (emphasis added).
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mum Federal standards."4' In Minnesota, the "best interests of the
child" are defined in section 518.17 of the Minnesota Statutes.42 But,
in child custody proceedings" involving an Indian child," the ICWA

41. See, e.g., State ex rel.Juvenile Dep't of Lane County v. Tucker, 710 P.2d 793, 799800 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (agreeing with the lower court that considering the best
interests of the child and applying the ICWA's minimum federal standards are
consistent obligations); see also Davis, supra note 34, at 468 (stating that the two purposes
of the ICWA-protecting the child's best interests and promoting the tribe's stability
and security-are intertwined). But see Kim, supra note 34, at 793 (concluding that the
goals of the ICWA can be unattainable when the interests of the children, tribes, and
parents are not identical).
42. The statute defines the "best interests of the child" as:
all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated by the court including(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
(2) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express preference;
(3) the child's primary caretaker;
(4) the intimacy of the relationship between each parent and the child;
(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parent or
parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's
best interests;
(6) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(7) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity,
(8) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home;
(9) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; except that
a disability, as defined in section 363.01, of a proposed custodian or the child
shall not be determinative of the custody of the child, unless the proposed
custodial arrangement is not in the best interest of the child;
(10) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love,
affection, and guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child in
the child's culture and religion or creed, if any;
(11) the child's cultural background;
(12) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if related to
domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, that has occurred between the
parents; and
(13) except in cases in which a finding of domestic abuse as defined in
section 518B.01 has been made, the disposition of each parent to encourage
and permit frequent and continuing contact by the other parent with the
child.
The court may not use one factor to the exclusion of all others. The
primary caretaker factor may not be used as a presumption in determining
the best interests of the child. The court must make detailed findings on
each of the factors and explain how the factors led to its conclusions and to
the determination of the best interests of the child.
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1994); see also Schumm v. Schumm, 510 N.W.2d 13, 14
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the statutory factors for a child's best interests must
be considered in custody decisions); Nazar v. Nazar, 509 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) (noting that in a custody modification, consideration of the statutory factors
is "absolutely required").
'foster care
43. "'[C]hild custody proceeding' shall ...include-(i)
placement' . . . (ii) 'termination of parental rights' . . . (iii) 'preadoptive
ment' ... and (iv) 'adoptive placement' ...." ICWA § 1903(1).
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preempts state law and section 518.17 of the Minnesota Statutes would
45
not apply.

State courts also must follow other applicable provisions of the Act
since it preempts state law. For example, in placing Indian children
in foster care,46 preadoptive homes,47 or adoptive homes,4" certain
preferences must be followed. 9 In the case of adoptions, the Act lists
three placement preferences. The child must be adopted by: "(I) a
member of the child's extended family; 50 (2) other members of the
Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families."5 ' These preferences "shall be given in the absence of good cause to the contrary."5 2 The
child's tribe may establish a different order of preference by resolution.5' Also, "[w]here appropriate, the preference of the Indian child
or parent shall be considered . . . ." In other words, under these
preferences, an Indian child could only be adopted by an Indian
family. An exception to this rule can be made if "good cause" is shown

44. The Act defines "Indian child" as "any unmarried person who is under age
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe."
ICWA § 1903(4).
45. In re the Custody of S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872, 880 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
In re Adoption of M.T.S., 489 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)). However,
"where State or Federal law... provides a higher standard of protection to the rights
of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under
[the Act], the ... court shall apply the [higher] State or Federal standard." ICWA
§ 1921.
46. Foster care placement is defined as:
any action removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for
temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a
guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot have
the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been
terminated ....
ICWA § 1903(1)(i).
47. Preadoptive placement is defined as "the temporary placement of an Indian
child in a foster home or institution after the termination of parental rights, but prior
to or in lieu of adoptive placement. . . ." ICWA § 1903(l)(iii).
48. Adoptive placement is defined as "the permanent placement of an Indian child
for adoption...." ICWA § 1903(1)(iv).
49. ICWA § 1915.
50. "'[E]xtended family member' shall be as defined by the law or custom of the
Indian child's tribe or... the Indian child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or
sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent .... " ICWA § 1903(2).
51. ICWA § 1915(a).
52. Id. (emphasis added); see alsoJohn Robert Renner, The Indian Child Welfare Act
and Equal Protection Limitations on the FederalPower over Indian Affairs, 17 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 129, 164-65 (1992) (discussing the placement preferences and good cause
provisions of section 1915).
53. ICWA § 1915(c).
54. Id.
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to not follow the preferences. Thus, only with a showing of "good
cause" can a non-Indian family adopt an Indian child.
C.

A Note on Minnesota State Law

Generally, the Act preempts state law.55 The exception to this
general rule is where state law provides enhanced protection "to the
rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child."56 The
Minnesota Legislature has enacted several statutes that are relevant to
adoption proceedings. For example, the Minnesota Indian Family
Preservation Act (MIFPA) 7 was enacted in 1985 and incorporates the
ICWA's principles into state law. 58 The MIFPA generally follows the
provisions of the ICWA, but also provides higher tribal protection by
requiring earlier tribal notification and additional provisions for tribal
intervention. 9 In effect, the ICWA is the governing law for adoption
proceedings of Indian children in Minnesota except for the higher

55. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Supremacy Clause); see also supra note 45 and
accompanying text. The Act's preemption of state law was explicitly recognized by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in the case that is the subject of this Comment. In re the
Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 1994) (noting that child placement decisions in Minnesota courts must meet the Act's minimum requirements).
56. ICWA § 1921.
57. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.35-.3579 (1994) [hereinafter MIFPA]. The Minnesota
Legislature has also adopted other provisions which relate to the placement of minority
children. See, e.g., 1983 MINN. LAWS ch. 278 (the Minnesota Minority Heritage Act
(MMHA) which provides guidelines for considering race and ethnic origin in foster
care and adoption placements). Although these provisions and others are not directly
relevant to the discussion in this Comment, they serve to point out the emphasis given
to the placement of minority children by the Minnesota Legislature.
58. For example, both the MIFPA and the ICWA define "adoptive placement" as
"the permanent placement of an Indian child for adoption." MINN. STAT. § 257.351,
subd. 3(a) (1994); ICWA § 1903(1) (iv). The MIFPA also uses the same language as the
ICWA to define an "Indian child" as an "unmarried person who is under age 18 and is:
(1) a member of an Indian tribe; or (2) eligible for membership in an Indian tribe."
MINN. STAT. § 257.351, subd. 6 (1994). But cf ICWA § 1903(3) (requiring a child who
is "eligible for membership in an Indian tribe" to also be "the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe"). The MIFPA also states a similar tribal jurisdiction
provision as the ICWA. Compare MINN. STAT. § 257.354, subd. 1 (1994) ("An Indian
tribe with a tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over a child placement proceeding
involving an Indian child who resides within the reservation of such tribe at the
commencement of the proceedings") with ICWA § 1911 (a) ("An Indian tribe shall have
jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an
Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except
where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law"). See
also Uthe, supra note 26, at 247 (comparing the MIFPA with the ICWA).
59. See MINN. STAT. §§ 257.352-.354 (1994); see also Uthe, supra note 26, at 247
(discussing the MIFPA's provisions); Michele K. Bennett, Comment, Indian Children:
Caught in the Web of the Indian Child Welfare Ac4 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 953, 956 (1993)
(same).
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tribal protection found in provisions such as the notification and
intervention requirements of the MIFPA. °
D. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Task Force on Racial Bias in the
Judicial System
In 1993, the Minnesota Supreme Court's Task Force on Racial Bias
in the Judicial System (Task Force) published a report on its findings
and recommendations. 61 The Task Force, chaired by Minnesota
Supreme CourtJustice Rosalie E. Wahl (now retired), considered the
issue of racial bias in Minnesota's judicial system by investigating
62
substantive, procedural, and personnel issues in the legal system.
The Task Force set up several committees to look at specific areas of
the judicial system such as criminal and civil processes.63
The Juvenile and Family Law Committee's function was to
"investigat[e] whether or not there are race-related differences in the
area of children in need of protective services (CHIPS), foster care
policies and procedures, and issues related to juvenile delinquency. " '
Through this committee, the Task Force found that minority children
were statistically over-represented in the foster care system.65 For
example, Indian children were in out-of-home placements at a rate
more than ten times that of white children.6 6
In addition to studying existing data from the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS), the Task Force used focus groups,

60. Note, however, that the ICWA is not by nature substantive. As one commentator has pointed out, "[a] Ithough a federal law, the ICWA is not a national substantive

code for juvenile child protection proceedings; it is rather an evidentiary and
procedural code which establishes minimum procedures for child protection proceedings
in each state under each state's substantive law." Gorman & Paquin, supra note 26, at
313.
61. Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System 16
HAMLINE L. REv. 477 (1993) [hereinafter Task Force on Racial Bias]. The report was the
culmination of a two-and-a-half-year study by the Task Force. Hon. A.M. Keith, The State
of the Judiciary,50 BENCH & B. MINN., Aug. 1993, at 21.
62. Task Force on Racial Bias, supra note 61, at 488.
63. Id. at 480.
64. Id. at 488. For a discussion of the historical background and recent
developments of Minnesota's CHIPS statutes, see Wright S. Walling & Gary A. Debele,
Private CHIPS Petitions in Minnesota: The Historicaland Contemporary Treatment of Children
in Need of Protectionor Services, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 781 (1994). See also Act of Apr.
26, 1988, ch. 673, 1988 MINN. LAwS 1031 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 260.015 (1994))
(designating all dependent and neglected children as "Children in Need of Protection
or Services" under the Minnesota CHIPS statutes).
65. Task Force on RacialBias, supra note 61, at 628. The study noted that "children
of color were over-represented by 3 to 12% of their representation in the general
population." Id. at 629.
66. Id.
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public hearings, and surveys of attorneys and judges.67 These data,
the Task Force concluded, demonstrated that some racial bias existed
in the foster care system. 68 Based on some of the survey results, the
Task Force believed that the problem partly stemmed from a lack of
familiarity with the basic provisions of the ICWA, the MIFPA, and
Minnesota's Minority Heritage Preservation Act (MHPA) .69 The Task
Force also blamed the "cultural insensitivity" of many social workers,
court-intake personnel, and judges for much of the bias. 7 The Task
Force's conclusion of cultural insensitivity was based on statistical
survey results of attorneys and judges and some open-ended responses
to the surveys.7"
While the Task Force considered all minority placements, it
specifically criticized the handling of Indian children in the foster care
system. 7 ' The Task Force noted that according to one survey, with an
admittedly very small sample size, Indians encountered problems and

67. Id. at 630.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 632-34 (noting a widespread level of ignorance of the ICWA's and the
Minority Heritage Protection Act's (MHPA) provisions byjudges, social workers, courtintake personnel, and attorneys). For example, 26% of all attorneys responding and
20% of all judges responding said that judicial decisions sometimes, rarely, or never
apply the ICWA or MHPA. Id. (Note: The MHPA recognized the extended nature of
many minority families. Act of Apr. 28, 1988, ch. 689, art. 2, § 218, MINN. LAwS 1435.)
70. Task Force on Racial Bias, supra note 61, at 640-42.
71. Id. For example, the Task Force report stated that "[o] ne-third of all judges
and nearly 70% of the metropolitan area judges say that [social workers and courtintake personnel] demonstrate cultural insensitivity sometimes, often or always in
working with minority families [and n]early 50% of all attorneys and over 60% of public
defenders agree." Id. at 641 (citations omitted). The report goes on to say that
"[n] early 25% of all judges and 63% of Hennepin and Ramsey County judges report
that judges, also, demonstrate cultural insensitivity always, often or sometimes in
working with minority families." Id. at 642 (citations omitted). The survey question
used for these statistics asked respondents to answer "always," "often," "sometimes,"
'rarely," "never," or "no basis for judgment" to the following:
Cultural insensitivity is demonstrated in working with minority families by:
a. social workers and court intake personnel.
b. guardians ad litem.
c. attorneys.
d. judges.
Id. at 729 (attorney questionnaire); id. at 745 (judge questionnaire). The report also
noted some open-ended responses that the Task Force believed demonstrated the type
of cultural insensitivity in the foster care system. Id. at 640-41. For example, a judge
related an incident where he asked an Indian boy's probation officer about the boy's
fond recollections of his grandfather. The probation officer responded, "yeah, he does
talk about those things [his tribe's culture and spiritual beliefs], but we know the reality,
which is that the grandfather was just an old drunk." Id. at 641.
72. Id. at 634-35, 640-42.
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frustrations when dealing with Social Services or the courts.73 Also,
all of the examples of open-ended responses which the Task Force said
showed cultural insensitivity involved the Act.74 The emphasis on
alleviating the problems encountered by Indians in the foster care
system is evident in the Task Force's recommendations. 7 Although
for the most part the recommendations are relevant to the problem of
racial bias generally, several of the recommendations
are specific to the
76
problems encountered by Indians.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has made a public effort to treat all
the Task Force's findings and recommendations seriously. The
Honorable A.M. "Sandy" Keith, Chief justice of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, confined his address to the 1993 annual convention
of the Minnesota State Bar Association to remarks about the Task
Force's report.77 The Chief Justice's remarks show that the judiciary
plans on implementing the Task Force's recommendations through
education, policies, programs, and legislation. 8
With this as a
backdrop, it is noteworthy that the case this Comment explores was
decided in the court of appeals just a few months after the Task
Force's report was published. 79 The supreme court opinion (which
was authored by the Chief justice) was handed down the following
year."
The justices on the court must have had the Task Force's
report in mind while this case was being decided.

73. Id. at 634-35 (noting problems such as lack of inquiry into tribal membership,
lack of written notice of rights under the Act, and lack of notice about the movement
of children in placement).
74. Id. at 640-41 (quoting (1) a response from an attorney about a Human Services
official who said that "the ICWA was getting in the way of [a] case," (2) the opinion of
a white judge that the Act is unconstitutional, and (3) a response from a judge about
a probation officer's remark that an Indian grandfather "was just an old drunk").
75. Id. at 647-49.
76. The Task Force's eighteen recommendations on children in the foster care
system included five that are at least partially related to Indians: (1) training in the
provisions of the Act forjudges, attorneys, social workers, guardians ad litem, and other
court personnel; (2) funding of the Indian Child Welfare Center; (3) inquiry into tribal
membership and requesting tribal intervention or jurisdiction; (4) recruitment and
certification of community experts under the Act; and (5) sanctions and penalties
against agencies that fail to follow the requirements of the Act. Task Force on Racial Bias,
supra note 61, at 647-49 (recommendations 4, 6, 9, 15, and 18).
77. Keith, supra note 61, at 21.
78. Id. at 23.
79. In re the Custody of S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872, 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
80. In re the Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 357 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied 115
S. Ct. 935 (1995).
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III.
A.

IN RE THE CUSTODY OF S.E.G.

Fact

In re the Custody of S.E.G. involved the petition of a non-Indian couple
(Petitioners) to adopt three Indian children."1 The three children
were biological sisters born in 1984, 1985, and 1987 to a Chippewa
woman and a Caucasian man."2 All three were enrolled members of
the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians (the Band).8"
Throughout most of their lives the children had been in foster care
with frequent moves from home to home. 4 The middle child was
the first to be moved away from the parents. She was placed in a
foster home in January 1986 while still an infant.85 Her older sister
joined her at a different home eight months later.8 6 The two
children were returned to their parents in December 1986, but less
than a year later were living with their maternal grandmother.8 7 After
the birth of the youngest child in November 1987, the mother
voluntarily placed all three children in foster care. 8 They continued
to be moved from home to home over the next three-year period, 9

81. Id. at 358. The courts referred to the individuals in the case by initials to
protect their identities. For readability, this Comment refers to E.C. and C.C. (the
couple petitioning for custody) as "Petitioners," and to the children (S.E.G., A.L.W., and
V.M.G.) by their birth order, i.e., "oldest," "middle," and "youngest" respectively.
82. Id. at 359; S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 875.
83. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 875. The Band was appellant at both the court of
appeals and supreme court phases of this case.
84. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 359. The oldest and youngest of the children were
suspected of being victims of sexual or physical abuse. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 876. Also,
all three children had a history of parental abandonment. Id.
85. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 359.
86. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 876.
87. Id. During the time they were with their parents, the family moved out of state,
violating a court order against such a move (the family was under Cass County
supervision).
S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 359. Subsequently, the family returned to
Minnesota, at which time the children moved in with their grandmother. Id.
88. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 359. The youngest child has never lived with her parents.
S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 876.
89. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 359. The court of appeals detailed the frequency of the
moves:
All three children were placed in the H. foster home in February 1988.
[The youngest child] was placed in the R. foster home in March 1988 and
[T]he Rs
[the two older children] were also placed [there] in April 1988 ....
asked to have the children removed.
The children were movcd to the W. foster home in February 1989 where
they stayed until October 1990. The children were abruptly removed from
this home after sexual abuse allegations [of which] the foster parents were
cleared ....
In October 1990, the children were placed in the L. foster home. Due
to a marriage dissolution, the children were abruptly returned to the home
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ending with their placement in Petitioners' foster home. °
However, the children's moves had not yet ended. In January 1992,
the children were moved into a preadoptive home which technically
fit within the Act's preferences.9' Unfortunately, this move was not
well planned (there was little prior preparation and no overnight visits)
and lasted only nine days.9" Then, the children were returned to
Petitioners' home.9" Although Petitioners had a good track record
meeting the children's physical, emotional, and intellectual needs,94
the children were moved to a home fitting the Act's guidelines, i.e., an
Indian home, in October 1992. 9' This move lasted less than two
months, however, and the children were moved yet again to another
Indian home.96
In November 1992, Petitioners filed a custody petition seeking to
adopt all three children.9 7 The Band opposed the adoption and the
matter went to trial in district court at Beltrami County.9 The trial
court, finding good cause to deviate from the Act's placement
preferences provisions, granted the custody petition. 99 The court of
appeals affirmed.'0 0 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.'0 '
In January 1995, the United States Supreme Court denied Petitioners'
request for certiorari. 0 2

of their uncle.
[The oldest child] was placed in the .. . foster home of [Petitioners] in
April 1991. Meanwhile, [the two younger children] were placed in the L.
foster home until the Ls asked to be relieved of their duties. [These two
children] were then also placed with [Petitioners] in August 1991.
S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 876.
90. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 359. Petitioners' home was a PATH (Professional
Association of Treatment Homes) foster home. Id. Although the home does not fit
into the Act's preferences for foster care placement, no Indian PATH homes were
available at the time the children were placed in Petitioners' home. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d
at 876.
91. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 359. The home fit within the Act's preferences only
because "Mrs. L. was 1/16 Chippewa and an enrolled member of the Fond du Lac Band
of Chippewa." S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 876.
92. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 359-60.
93. Id. at 360.
94. Id.; S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 883.
95. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 360.
96. Id. The foster mother in the first Indian PATH home was "emotionally not
ready to handle the children." Id.
97. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 876. The parental rights of the biological parents had
been terminated in December 1991. Id.
98. Id.
99. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 358.
100. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 885 (2-1 decision).
101. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 366 (en banc) (holding that good cause to deviate from
the Act's preferences had not been established).
102. Campbell v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 115 S. Ct. 935 (1995).
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The Trial Court's Decision

The trial court found that the children had extraordinary emotional
needs that would be improved by an adoptive placement.' °3 The
children's emotional needs were brought on by several factors. The
two older children were suspected of having been victims of sexual or
physical abuse.'0 4 Both had a need for therapy to deal with their
behavioral, emotional, and social problems.' t The oldest child had
special educational service needs and was diagnosed with a "severe
adjustment disorder."0 6 The middle child, with arguably the worst
problems of the three children, exhibited destructive acting out
behavior and was diagnosed with "an extreme case of posttraumatic
stress disorder."' 0 7 The youngest child also had behavioral and
The
emotional needs "resulting from neglect and instability."'08
court based its finding of extraordinary emotional needs on these facts
and concluded that the children's needs resulted "from multiple placements, neglect, [and] changes in family and school environments. " ' °
The trial court also found that there was an unavailability of suitable
Indian families for adoption after an extensive search."0 The Band
had searched for an Indian adoptive home for fifteen months."'
During that time, one adoptive placement was attempted but failed
after only nine days." 2
Although the Band's adoption worker
testified about having an active file of forty-eight Indian adoptive
homes, only one of these was offered as a potential home for the
children."' But, the family in that home, which was in Missouri, was
not told about the children's specific problems." 4 Also, the children's guardian ad litem had been told by the adoption worker that
the children were no longer on the national adoption registry and
would not be put back on it for five years." 5
The trial court concluded that the children's needs and the
unavailability of suitable families provided good cause to deviate from

103.
104.
105.
106.

S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 358.
S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 881 (quoting the trial court record).
Id.
Id.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 358.
111. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 881.
112. Id. at 876.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 881.
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the Act's placement preferences provisions.1 6 The court awarded
custody of the children to the non-Indian Petitioners." 7 The Band
appealed."'
C. The Court of Appeals'Decision
The Minnesota Court of Appeals listed six issues for its review of the
trial court's finding of good cause to deviate from the Act's preferences: (1) the trial court's standard of proof for determining good
cause;119 (2) the appellate standard of review; 2 ° (3) the applicable
factors in determining good cause; (4) the fact of a child's need for
permanence in determining extraordinary emotional needs; (5)
support of the evidence by qualified expert testimony; and (6) state
court deference to the child's tribe's recommendations. 2' After
analyzing these issues, the court of appeals affirmed22 the trial court's
decision to allow Petitioners to adopt the children.

116. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 358.
117. Id.
118. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 875.
119. The Act does not specify a standard of proof for determining good cause. The
court of appeals stated that ordinarily, legislative silence indicates an intention to apply
a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. S.E. G., 507 N.W.2d at 878. But, since the
"good cause to the contrary" language of section 1915(1) is the "most important
substantive requirement imposed on state courts," a higher standard must be applied.
Id. (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36-37
(1989)). The court also considered a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, but rejected it as too high because it takes away state courts' flexibility in determining good
cause. Id. at 877-78 (rejecting the standard proposed by two amici, the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe and the Minneapolis American Indian Center). The court of appeals
ended up applying a "clear and convincing evidence" standard. Id. at 878 (agreeing
with the trial court).
120. The Band argued that the trial court's decision is subject to de novo review.
Id. at 878 (explaining that the Band saw the case as involving statutory interpretation
which as a matter of law is subject to de novo review). The court, however, agreed with
Petitioners' contention that an "abuse of discretion" standard of review applies. Id. at
878-79 (pointing out that custody proceedings under Minnesota state law are reviewed
under this standard). The court also noted other states' application of this standard of
review in child placement matters under the Act. Id. at 879 (citing In re Adoption of
F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Alaska 1993); In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile
Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); In reAdoption of M., 832
P.2d 518, 522 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)). Having adopted this standard, the court of
appeals explained that it "will find an abuse of discretion only if the trial court's factual
findings are clearly erroneous or the trial court considered improper factors in making
its determination." Id. at 879; accord Cooter & Cell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405
(1990) ("A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on
an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence").
121. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 879.
122. Id. at 885 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that good cause to deviate from the Act's preferences had been
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1. Factorsfor Good Cause
After establishing a "clear and convincing" standard of proof and an
"abuse of discretion" standard of review, the court of appeals went on
to the issue of good cause to deviate from the Act's preferences for
adoptive placements. 12 1 The term "good cause" is not defined in the
Act. The court relied on three sources for a meaning: (1) the
Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs' guidelines (BIA
Guidelines) for applying the Act; 124 (2) case law from other states;
and (3) the Act's legislative history. 2 5
The BIA Guidelines give three considerations for determining good
cause:
(i) The request of the biological parents or the child when the
child is of sufficient age.
(ii) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child as
established by testimony of a qualified expert witness.
(iii) The unavailability of suitable families for placement after a
diligent search has been completed for families meeting the
preference criteria.' 26
One or more
of these considerations should be present to establish
27
good cause.

Case law from other states added other factors to consider, such as
"the best interests of the child, the wishes of the biological parents, the
suitability of persons preferred for placement and the child's ties to the
tribe."' 2 Finally, although the Act presumes the interests of the child
are best served by applying the preferences, the court of appeals noted
that the Act's legislative history confirms that the presumption should
"not be read as precluding the placement of an Indian child with a

established) (2-1 decision). The dissenting opinion concluded that "the trial court
abused its discretion in finding 'good cause' to deviate from the adoption placement
preferences in the Act." Id. at 888 (Schumacher, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 879-82.
124. Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,583 (1979) [hereinafter
BIA Guidelines].
125. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 878.
126. BIA Guidelines, supra note 124, at 67,594. The court noted that the guidelines
are not regulations and do not have binding legislative effect. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at
879 n.2. However, they are given important but not controlling significance. Id.; see
also BIA Guidelines, supra note 124, at 67,584.
127. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 879.
128. Id. at 879-80 (citing In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1363-64 (Alaska
1993)); In re Adoption of M., 832 P.2d 518, 522 (Wash. 1992) (also stating the
additional factor: the child's ability to make any cultural adjustments necessitated by a
particular placement); In re Interest of J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 321-22 (Iowa 1984)
(consideration should be given to the child's heritage)).
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non-Indian family."
The trial court applied factors (ii) (extraordinary physical and
emotional needs) and (iii) (unavailability of suitable families) of the
BIA Guidelines"3 in addition to the best interests of the children in
deciding that the adoption petition should be granted. 3 ' The court
of appeals determined that the evidence supported the trial court's
findings that (1) suitable families to meet the Act's preference criteria
were not available, and that (2) the children had extraordinary
emotional needs.3 2 Nevertheless, the court of appeals reasoned that
the children's extraordinary emotional needs, except for their need for
permanence, could be met in the Indian foster home where they were
Consequently, under the court of
residing at the time of trial.'
for permanence became the
need
children's
the
appeals' analysis,
critical factor."
2.

The Need for Permanence

Several experts for both sides testified that the children needed a
This was necessary not just for the current
permanent home.'
placement, but "for the duration of their childhood and adolescence."'3 6 In other words, although the children's other extraordinary emotional needs were being met at that time, continuing to move
them from one foster home to another would not be conducive to
their well-being. 7
The Band and Beltrami County1 argued that the trial court had
erroneously elevated permanence to a new good cause basis.3 9 The
court of appeals, however, stated that "the [trial] court merely
considered permanence to be a necessary factor in meeting the

129. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 880 (quoting 1978 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 34, at 23).
130. See supra text accompanying note 126.
131. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 880. Factor (i) of the BIA Guidelines (request of the
parent or child) was not used because the biological parents did not express a
preference and because the trial court made no findings on the children's preferences.
Id. at 880 n.3. However, the children's guardian ad litem, an Indian woman, did testify
that the children preferred to live with Petitioners. Id. Also, although the suitability
of persons preferred for placement was not directly addressed, this was not a factor
since the court determined that there was an unavailability of suitable families within
the Act's preferences. Id. at 880-81.
132. Id. at 880-82.
133. Id. at 881-82.
134. Id. at 882.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Beltrami County appeared in the case as the county of financial responsibility.
Id. at 875 n.1.
139. Id. at 882.
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case." 140

The court acknowledged that an Indian child's need for permanence
would be strengthened through tribal and cultural ties;14 ' however,
the court believed adoption by Petitioners would not completely sever
these connections to their heritage.142 Petitioners had "testified
that... they would follow through with culturally appropriate activities
for the three children." 4 1 The court felt that although these ties
would not be as strong as day-to-day living in an Indian setting, the
unique needs of the children take precedence over the incremental
advantages such a setting would provide.' 44
The court of appeals concluded that a child's need for permanence
was a factor in determining the child's extraordinary emotional
needs.' 4 5 This was true even though permanence by itself cannot
constitute good cause to deviate from the Act's placement preferences. 46 Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court
correctly established a good cause exception to the Act's preferences
by considering the children's need for permanence
as a factor in
47
determining their extraordinary emotional needs.
3. Qualfied Expert Testimony
According to the court of appeals, a child's extraordinary emotional
or physical needs must be established by qualified expert testimony.'" The court noted that under the BIA Guidelines, a person
needs to meet certain qualifications to testify as an expert during a
149
child placement proceeding.

140. Id. (emphasis added). These children had extraordinary emotional needs
which were partially the result of the many failed placements through the foster care
system. See id. (distinguishing this case from other placements where permanence
would not suffice to establish good cause).
141. Id. at 883.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 884.
146. Id.

147.

Id.

148. Id. (agreeing with BIA Guidelines, supra note 124, at 67,594).
149. The trial court used the Department of Human Services (DHS) manual which
follows the BIA's guidelines for qualifying expert witnesses. Id. at 884-85. Under the
guidelines, an expert witness should be:
(i) A member of the Indian child's tribe who is recognized by the tribal
community as knowledgeable in tribal customs as they pertain to family
organization and childrearing practices.
(ii) A lay expert witness having substantial experience in the delivery of child
and family services to Indians, and extensive knowledge of prevailing social
and cultural standards and childrearing practices within the child's tribe.
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The Band argued that the findings were not supported by testimony
of properly qualified experts.5 Some of the witnesses for both sides
were not expressly qualified by the trial court despite appearing to
5
Conversely, the court of appeals noted
meet the necessary criteria.5'
that other witnesses called by both sides were expressly qualified as
experts. 5 2 The trial court explicitly noted that it relied on "qualified
experts" in its conclusions and in its memorandum. 53 The court of
appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
relying on their testimony.1 4 The court of appeals noted that it was
not required to examine the qualified expert issue because the scope
of review was "limited to whether the record supports the findings of
those findings support the conclusions of law and the
fact and whether
155

judgment."
4.

Deference to the Tribe's Recommendations

Another challenge to the trial court's decision was raised by two
amici: the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe and the Minneapolis American
Indian Center. 56 The amici argued that if the Indian tribe has
formally intervened in a child placement proceeding, the state court
must completely defer to the tribe's recommendation. 57 The court
of appeals rejected this argument pointing out that it would render a
and, further, that
state court's child placement proceeding meaningless
58
it was contrary to the Act's legislative history.

(iii) A professional person having substantial education and experience in the
area of his or her specialty and having substantial knowledge of prevailing
social and cultural standards and childrearing practices within the Indian
community.
Id. at 884 n.5 (quoting BIA Guidelines, supra note 124, at 67,593).
150. Id. at 884.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 885. In other words, the Band and Petitioners both presented witnesses
who were not expressly qualified and witnesses who were expressly qualified as experts
by the trial court. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The court of appeals noted that it was not required to examine the
qualified expert issue because the scope of review was "limited to whether the record
supports the findings of fact and whether those findings support the conclusions of law
and the judgment."
155. Id. at 884 (limiting the scope of appeal when there has been no motion for a
new trial or for amended findings) (citing Beasley v. Medin, 479 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992); Kuchenmeister v. Kuchenmeister, 414 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987)). Nevertheless, the court felt the issue was important, and used its discretionary
power to review any matter as the "interest ofjustice may require." Id. (citing MINN.
R. Cry. APP. P. 103.04).
156. Id. at 885.
157. Id.
158. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss4/5

20

CHILD
WELFARE
Saffouri: TheINDIAN
Good Cause
Exception
to theACT
IndianPLACEMENTS
Child Welfare Act's Placem

1996]

The court stated that if the tribe's recommendation was conclusive,
there would be nothing for the trial court to decide and the taking of
other evidence would be an idle exercise.'59 Equally important, the
Act's legislative history indicates that Congress did not believe it
"necessary or desirable to oust the States of their traditional jurisdiction over Indian children ...."160 Moreover, the Act gives state
courts discretion in determining good cause; and, although "[t]he
tribe's wishes are certainly an important factor," the court rejected the
argument that complete deference must be given to the tribe's

recommendation. 161
D.

The Supreme Court'sDecision

The Minnesota Supreme Court stated the main issue in the case as
"whether there is good cause not to follow the preference provisions
of [section] 1915(a) [of the Act].' 6 2 Specifically, the court had to
decide whether there was good cause to allow a non-Indian couple to
adopt three Indian children in contravention of the Act's adoption
preferences. In determining whether the lower court's findings and
conclusions supported the result that good cause existed, the supreme
court examined the following: (1) the factors to use in establishing
good cause; (2) the standard of review of the trial court's decision; (3)
the trial court's finding that no suitable families for placement could
be located; and (4) the trial court's finding that good cause existed
because of the children's extraordinary emotional needs.
1.

Factorsfor Good Cause

The supreme court relied on the BIA Guidelines to establish the
criteria for good cause. 6 ' The BIA Guidelines state that "a determination of good cause not to follow the order of preferences [of the
Because of this
Act] shall be based on [the factors listed]. " "
language, the court held "that a determination that good cause
exists ...should be based upon a finding of one or more of the factors
described in the guidelines.""

159.

Id.

160. Id. (quoting 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 34, at 19).
161. Id.
162. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 361.
163. Id. at 361-63.
164. BIA Guidelines, supra note 124, at 67,594 (emphasis added); see supra text
accompanying note 126 (listing the BIA factors).
165. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363 (emphasis added) (stating that "[t]hough the BIA
guidelines are not binding on the courts, the use of the word 'shall' . . . strongly
suggests that a consideration of whether good cause exists should be limited to the
factors described in the guidelines").
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The supreme court noted that the trial court correctly used two

proper factors.'6 Since the factors were appropriate, the task for the
supreme court was to "carefully review the trial court's findings 1to
67
determine whether they were adequately supported by the record."
2.

Standard of Review

Before reviewing the record, the supreme court addressed the
standard of review. The supreme court agreed with the court of
appeals that an "abuse of discretion" standard of review is the proper
standard for a trial court's findings of good cause."6 But, the court
also clarified that "considering improper factors" or "improperly
weighing factors" are issues of law and are reviewed using a de novo
standard.'69 This is an important point because by framing the
standard of review issue in this way, the supreme court was able to
ignore some of the lower court's factual findings. Unfortunately, the
court did this by mixing together two independent sets of facts which
the trial court had analyzed separately. 7 °
3.

Reversing the Findingof No Suitable Familiesfor Placement

The supreme court analyzed the issue of the availability of suitable
families for placement by mixing in the facts relating to the children's
need for permanence. The facts relating to permanence had been
considered by the trial court to be relevant in evaluating the children's
extraordinary emotional
needs, and not as the basis for a search for
171
suitable families.
The supreme court acknowledged that a child's need for permanence could, in certain cases, be considered in determining whether
good cause exists.17'2 However, the court believed that permanence
has a different meaning in Indian culture.173 In support of this
contention, the court noted the Task Force's findings 174 of problems
with
"a system that is largely white, with middle-class
values ... evaluat[ing] cultural and racial norms which are neither

166.

Id. (noting the trial court's findings that the children had extraordinary

emotional needs and that no suitable family was available).
167. Id.
168. Id.; see also supra notes 120 and accompanying text (discussing the court of
appeals' handling of the standard of review issue).
169. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363.
170.

See infra part III.D.3.

171.
172.

S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 884.
S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363 (citing In reAdoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1365

(Alaska 1993)).

173. Id. at 364 (accepting the Band's argument).
174. See supra part IID.
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175
white nor necessarily middle-class.
The supreme court also believed the trial court had erroneously
found the need for permanence aloneto be an extraordinary emotional
need. 76 The children's needs, other than the need for permanence,
were being met at their current Indian foster home. 77 Thus, the
supreme court reasoned, the trial court must have improperly assumed
that the need
for permanence could only be met by an adoptive
78
placement. 1
The supreme court, however, did not address the actual search
conducted by the Band for an Indian adoptive home. 79 Instead, the
court concluded that the children's need for permanence did not
require a search for an adoptive home."8 Consequently, the court
reversed as a matter of law the holding that no suitable family for
placement had been found. 8 In effect, the court took the issue of
permanence and applied it to the finding that no suitable family
existed. The trial court had used the issue of permanence as a factual
issue supporting its finding of extraordinary emotional needs.

4.

Reversing the Finding that ExtraordinaryEmotional Needs
Were Sufficient to Show Good Cause
The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals about establishing extraordinary emotional needs through qualified expert testimony. 182
It also agreed on the characteristics
of qualified expert
83
witnesses as described in the BIA Guidelines.
Having noted the criteria for qualifying expert witnesses, the court

implied that Petitioners' expert witnesses were not properly qualified

175. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 364 (quoting Task Force on Racial Bias, supra note 61, at
631).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 880 (describing the failed efforts to find an Indian
adoptive home).
180. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 364.
181. Id.
182. Id.; see also supra part III.C.5 (describing the court of appeals' handling of this

issue).
183. Id. at 364-65 (restating the BIA Guidelines for qualifying expert witnesses); see
supranote 152 (listing the BIA Guidelines' criteria). The supreme court also noted that
the Minnesota Department of Human Services Social Services Manual adds the
requirement of expertise about Indian childrearing practices to paragraph (iii) of the
BIA Guidelines. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 365 (quoting In re Welfare of B.W., 454 N.W.2d

437, 442 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); also citing Minnesota Department of Human Services,
Minnesota Social Services Manual, XIII-3586 (1987)).
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and that the Band had presented more expert witnesses.' 4 One of
Petitioners' expert witnesses and the children's guardian ad litem
testified that the children's cultural needs could be met in Petitioners'
home, but the court focused on other expert testimony presented by
the Band.'
This testimony concerned the notion that the children's
emotional needs, other than the need for permanency, were being met
in their current foster home. 8 6 Consequently, the supreme court
believed the finding of extraordinary emotional needs was not
established by qualified expert testimony and thus the finding was
clearly erroneous. 7
5.

The Supreme Court's Conclusion

The supreme court concluded that neither of the factors used by the
trial court were supported by the findings.s This conclusion was
based on two lines of thought. First, there was no support for the
finding of an unavailability of suitable families for placement.
According to the supreme court, the finding was not supported
because the trial court improperly assumed that adoption is the only
way to satisfy the children's need for permanence. Second, the finding
that the children had extraordinary emotional needs was not supported by qualified expert testimony. Therefore, the court felt that the
record did not show good cause to deviate from the Act's placement
preferences. 8 9 Thus, the supreme court reversed the decisions of
the lower courts.' 9

IV. ANALYsIs
A.

Introduction
The Minnesota Supreme Court went out of its way to reverse the
trial court and the court of appeals. It emphasized certain testimony
while it ignored or gave little credibility to other testimony, including

184. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 365. Although the trial court based its decision on
qualified expert testimony, the supreme court said "[Petitioners] presented only two
witnesses whom they attempted to qualify as expert witnesses." Id. (emphasis added).
Yet, in the next paragraph, the court refers to both of these witnesses as qualified
experts. Id. at 365 & n.8.
185. Id. at 365.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.

188. This was so even though the supreme court applauded the trial court for its
"careful decisions... and [its] thorough findings of fact and thoughtful memorandum." Id. at 366.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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that of expert witnesses.' 9' The court also emphasized the Act's
historical underpinnings and the Task Force's findings. 9 2 Both the
Act's history and the Task Force's work revealed problems facing
Indian tribes in state court proceedings. 9 ' While the existence of
these problems is an important factor to consider, the court should
have more heavily weighed the interests of the individual children
whose well-being was at stake.
The proximity in time between the end of the Task Force's work,
which was initiated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, and the court's
decision in this case probably influenced the result. Even the
Executive Director of the Indian Child Welfare Law Center in
Minneapolis, who praised the Supreme Court's decision, believed the
result would have been different without the Task Force's concluwith the facts of
sions. 1"' It is hard to reconcile the court's decision
95
the case if only the governing law is considered.
Another factor conflicting with the supreme court decision was the
trial court's handling of the case. The supreme court praised "that
court's careful decision at trial ...and the court's thorough findings
of fact and thoughtful memorandum."' 96 Yet, the supreme court
reversed the trial court because of what it thought to be clearly
erroneous findings of fact.' 97 The court also ignored other facts to
conclude that certain rulings were based on improper assumptions.' 9
The In re the Custody of S.E.G. decision is undesirable for three

Id. at 365.
Id.at 358-59, 364.
Id.
194. Donna Halverson, Court Sides with Tribes on Adoption:JusticesFind No 'Good Cause'
to Let Non-Indian PairAdopt, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 2, 1994, at 1A.
195. While the supreme court was properly concerned with implementing the Task
Force's report, it should be noted that the handling of this matter was in conformity
with the report's recommendations. For example, the Band, as is proper, intervened
in the case from the outset. See Task Force on Racial Bias, supra note 61 at 647-48
(recommendations 3 and 9 relating to the tribal right of intervention). Also, an Indian
guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the children's interests. S.E.G., 521
N.W.2d at 361 n.2; see Task Force on Racial Bias, supra note 61 at 648 (recommendation
10, advocating the recruitment and retention of minority guardians ad litem). The
Minnesota Rules ofJuvenile Procedure require the appointment of a guardian ad litem
"to protect the interest of the child." MINN. R.JUVENILE P. 41.01; see also MINN. STAT.
191.

192.
193.

§ 259.33 (1994) (allowing court appointment of a guardian ad litem for the person
being adopted). For a description of the guardian ad litem's role in Minnesota, see
Deborah A Randolph & Susanne K. Smith, Advocates for Children: The Role of the
Guardianad Litem, 48 BENCH. & B. MINN., Aug. 1991, at 30. With these safeguards in
place, the supreme court should have taken a more balanced approach to considering
both the Band's and the children's interests.
196. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 366.
197. Id. at 365.
198. Id. at 364.
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reasons. First, the supreme court distorted the qualified expert
issue.' 99 Second, the court misconstrued the lower courts' handling
of the permanence issue. 2°° And third, the court ignored the search
for suitable families.2 °' This section criticizes the supreme court's
handling of the case by analyzing the three main weaknesses in the
court's opinion. This section also suggests a more balanced judicial
approach to meeting the Act's goals in adoptive placement proceedings.2 °2 This type of approach is more likely to meet the interests of
both the tribe and the child in such proceedings than the approach
announced by the court in In re the Custody of S.E.G.
B.

The Qualified Expert Issue

The Act does not explicitly require the testimony of qualified expert
witnesses to determine the existence of extraordinary physical or
emotional needs. 20 3 However, the BIA guidelines contain such a
requirement, and this requirement is sensible. 2° ' The trial, appellate,
and supreme courts all quite properly applied this standard. However,
the supreme court mischaracterized the trial record on the qualified
expert issue by stating: "Most of the testimony in this case which
tended to establish that the children had extraordinary physical or
emotional needs was not presented by qualified expert witnesses."2 5
This statement is misleading in two ways.
First, the finding of the children's extraordinary emotional needs was
established by qualified experts testifying for both the Petitioners and
the Band. For example, experts testified about how to treat the oldest
child's emotional needs, about the middle child's extraordinary need
for an immediate permanent placement, and about the youngest
child's needs for a "secure, calm, consistent environment."2 0 6 The
court of appeals specifically acknowledged the trial court's reliance on
qualified expert testimony when it reviewed this issue.20 7 Moreover,
by finding " [ m] ost of the testimony.., was not presented by qualified
expert witnesses," the supreme court's above-quoted statement shows

199. See infra part IV.B.
200. See infra part 1V.C.
201. See infta part IV.D.
202. See infra part V.E.
203. Cf ICWA § 1912 (e), (f) (requiring qualified expert witness testimony for foster
care and termination of parental rights proceedings).
204. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
205. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 365.
206. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 882.
207. Id. at 885 (noting the trial court's explicit statements showing reliance on the
testimony of qualified expert witnesses in establishing the children's extraordinary
emotional needs).
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20 8
that some qualified expert testimony supported the finding.
Second, the supreme court implied that Petitioners' experts were not
properly qualified. The court stated that "[Petitioners] presented only
two witnesses whom they attempted to qualify as expert witnesses. "209

This implication is wrong. Although the court said that Petitioners
only attempted to qualify their expert witnesses, the court referred to
these same witnesses as "qualified experts" in the next paragraph.2 10
Both of these witnesses testified about the children's needs and the
ability of Petitioners to meet those needs.211 In any case, even if
these witnesses had not been qualified properly, the trial court based
its decision on the testimony of qualified expert witnesses regardless of
whether those witnesses testified on behalf of Petitioners or the
Band. 12
In addition, the court's criticism of the number of experts proffered
by Petitioners is unsound. The credibility and weight of expert
testimony should be left to the trier of fact short of an abuse of
discretion, and should not simply depend on the number of witnesses
presented at trial.213 As the court of appeals stated, "[t]he weight
and credibility afforded conflicting testimony is not to be determined
by the number of witnesses one produces. The trial court, sitting
without a jury, is the sole judge of credibility of witnesses and may
accept all or only part of any witness' testimony. "214
Ignoring this well-settled matter of court trials, the supreme court
concluded that the trial court's finding of extraordinary emotional
need was clearly erroneous. 215 According to the court, this conclusion was warranted due to the following: "Of the experts qualified by

208. See supra text accompanying note 205. If only "most" of the testimony was not
presented by qualified expert witnesses, then "some" of it must have been presented by
qualified expert witnesses.
209. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 365 (emphasis added).
210. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 365 (referring to both of Petitioners' witnesses as
"qualified experts").
211. Id.
212. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 885.
213. Id. at 883 n.4.
214. Id. (citations omitted); see also In reWelfare of TJJ., 366 N.W.2d 651 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the trial court's determination of the qualifications and
competency of expert witnesses will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of
discretion); Teslow v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 273 Minn. 309, 312, 141
N.W.2d 507, 509 (1966) (stating that it is "axiomatic in this state that the sufficiency of
the foundation to qualify a witness as an expert is a question left almost entirely to the
trial court, and [the appellate court] will not reverse unless it is clearly apparent that
the trial court was wrong"). In addition, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure require
that in non-jury trials, "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." MINN. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
215. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 365.
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the trial court, none testified that the children had extraordinary
emotional needs which were not being met in their current placement." 216 However, the current placement was a foster home, which
by definition is temporary.217 Although the court referred to "permanent foster care" as a possibility,218 this term refers to keeping the
children in (multiple) foster homes throughout their childhoods, and
not to placing them permanently in a single foster home. The foster
home the children were in at the time of the decision will not satisfy
the children's need for permanence since it is a temporary placement.
Because the children's behavioral, emotional, and social problems were
partly caused by their previous moves, 21 9 these problems will most
likely recur when they are moved again.220 In fact, as of this writing,
the foster parent in this home had moved out of Minnesota. 22' The
children are now living with a great-uncle and aunt who sought custody
after the Petitioners had filed their petition. 22
The trial court relied on qualified expert testimony to establish the
children's extraordinary emotional needs. Some of this testimony was
proffered by Petitioners' experts who were properly qualified. Since
the credibility and weight of this testimony is for the trier of fact to
judge, the supreme court should not have reversed the trial court on
this issue.
C.

The PermanenceIssue

The supreme court stressed the idea that "permanency is defined
differently in Native American cultures." 22' This definition involves
a view of an extended family that can include "scores[, or] perhaps
more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as close, responsible

216. Id. (emphasis added).
217. See ICWA § 1903 (1)(i), (iii) (defining "foster care placement" and
"preadoptive placement" as temporary placements in a foster home).

218. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363-64 (describing the Commissioner of Human Services'
argument that adoption is not the only permanent placement option).
219. See S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 881 (attributing the children's needs to multiple
moves within the foster care system).
220. Ironically, the Act explicitly requires that
[n]o foster care placement may be ordered.., in the absence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the
parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child.
ICWA § 1912(e). No such determination was made in this case as to the children's
then-current foster care placement.
221. Donna Halverson, Siblings Can't Be Adopted by White Family, Court Rules, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 24, 1995, at 1B, 2B.
222. Id.
223. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 364.
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members of the family."124 Because the need for permanency using
this definition could possibly be met by an attachment to the tribe, the
court felt that an adoptive placement was unnecessary. But, this
analysis missed the point made by the lower courts. The point was that
the evidence adduced supported a need for permanence that could
only be met by an adoptive placement. 225 The Band itself had
initiated the search for an adoptive home.22 6 This fact seems to
indicate that even the Band at one point believed an adoptive
placement was necessary.
The supreme court acknowledged that a need for permanence may
be considered in determining whether good cause existed. 7
However, it distinguished an Alaska Supreme Court decision involving
a voluntary adoption. In In re Adoption of EH., the Alaska Supreme
Court considered permanency as a factor in establishing good cause to
deviate from the Act's preferences.228 In this case, the child was born
to a mother who abused alcohol. 2' The child's prenatal exposure
to alcohol caused medical problems and "placed her at risk for
developmental delay and learning and behavioral problems." 2 0 This
case is similar to In re the Custody of S.E.G. as the child lived in several
foster homes, including the home of white foster parents who
petitioned to adopt her.23' Also, the biological mother was willing to
give up custody voluntarily but only on the condition that the
petitioning couple be allowed to adopt the child. 2 The court found
that the child had a need for a permanent placement and further
reasoned that the child's future was uncertain if the adoption by the

224. Id.
225. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 882 (listing the testimony of "numerous witnesses,"
including experts and the children's guardian ad litem, that indicated a need for a
permanent home for each of the children).
226. Id. at 881.
227. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363. Thus, the supreme court implicitly rejected the
argument that the trial court and the court of appeals had wrongly raised permanence
alone to a new good cause standard. The Band had argued that allowing permanence
as a factor would place "nearly every Indian child currently in an out-of-home foster
placement.., at risk for adoption in a non-Indian home." S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 882.
The court of appeals rejected that argument noting that the trial court had
merely considered permanence to be a necessary factor in meeting the
extraordinary emotional needs of these particular children in this particular
case. The many failed placements and resultant extraordinary emotional
needs experienced by the children here serve to distinguish this case.., from
the cases of other Indian children presently in foster care.
Id.
228. In reAdoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Alaska 1993).
229. Id. at 1362.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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white foster parents were not allowed..2 " The Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision to grant the white couple's petition
to adopt the child.M
The Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished this case based on the
Alaska Supreme Court's finding that the child's future would be
uncertain if the adoption were not allowed. 2 5 It is unclear though,
how the child's future was any less certain in the Alaska case than the
children's future in the Minnesota case. In both cases, the children
involved had a need for permanence and there was a concern that
foster care would not satisfy that need. 36
Also, in the Alaska case, the court did not directly address the child's
cultural needs. 23 7 At least the trial court in the Minnesota case was
concerned with this point and noted Petitioners' willingness to
maintain the children's cultural ties.238 The testimony showed that
the children's cultural needs could be met by an adoptive placement
with Petitioners. 23 9 For example, Petitioners testified that they would
involve the children in culturally appropriate activities. 24° One of the
qualified experts testified that the children's cultural needs could be
met in a non-Indian home. 24 In addition, the trial court added a
safeguard to the award of custody to Petitioners by ordering them to
submit an appropriate racial and cultural education plan for the
children.2 42
The trial court weighed the children's cultural needs in arriving at
its decision. It also properly considered the children's need for
permanence as a factor in determining good cause to deviate from the
Act's preference provisions. Therefore, the trial court's holding was
not based on an improper assumption and should not have been
reversed.243

233. Id. at 1364.
234. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court also considered maternal preference, the bond
between the adoptive mother and the child, and the openness of the adoption in
allowing the adoption outside the Act's preferences. Id. at 1364-65.
235. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 365.
236. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 882-84; F.H., 851 P.2d at 1365.
237. The Alaska Supreme Court only indirectly addressed the child's Indian
heritage. F.H., 851 P.2d at 1363 (noting that an open adoption would allow the
biological mother access to the child which would possibly give the child exposure to
her Indian heritage).
238. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 883.
239. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 365.
240. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 883.
241. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 365.
242. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 883.
243. Because of the supposed improper assumption, the supreme court reversed the
trial court's holding as a matter of law. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 364.
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The Search for Suitable Families

The trial court had used the issue of permanence to determine the
children's extraordinary emotional needs and thus to establish good
cause. 244 By putting a reverse twist on this issue, the supreme court
was able to ignore the trial court's finding that there were no suitable
Indian families available to adopt the children. 245 The supreme
court observed that the findings on a diligent search for a suitable
home must be carefully reviewed "to determine whether they were
adequately supported by the record." 246 But, it ignored the fact that
all efforts to keep the children in an Indian home had failed miserably. 247 Instead, the court impliedly concluded that no search was
necessary because a permanent home was not necessary.
There are two things wrong with this conclusion. First, it glosses
over the fact that the Band had conducted a search for an adoptive
placement and then had argued against such a placement during the
case. 24
The Band's efforts to locate an adoptive home seem to
indicate that the Band believed adoption was appropriate. This is not
meant to imply that a search for an adoptive home is always required.
But, the BIA Guidelines acknowledge that when a search is conducted
and proves to be fruitless in finding a family meeting the Act's
249
preferences, a factor for establishing good cause has been met.
Second, and more importantly, "the unavailability of suitable
families" factor is independentfrom the "extraordinary emotional needs"
factor. 50 Put another way, the children's extraordinary emotional
needs, including the need for permanence, were part of a distinct
factor to be used in establishing good cause; the BIA Guidelines do not
require a showing of extraordinary emotional needs before a fruitless
search for suitable families may be considered as grounds for good
cause to deviate from the Act's placement preferences.25'
The trial court's findings show that a diligent search for an adoptive
placement was conducted by the Band.25 2 Since the search did not
yield a suitable placement, the trial court correctly established good
cause to deviate from the Act's preferences on this factor alone

244. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 882.
245. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 364.
246. Id. at 363 (noting that a search for suitable families is one of the factors
allowed by the BIA Guidelines).
247. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 880.
248. Id. at 881.
249. BIA Guidelines, supra note 124, at 67,584.
250. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 363; S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 879; see also BIA Guidelines,
supra note 124, at 67,584.
251. BIA Guidelines, supra note 124, at 67,584.
252. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 880.
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(regardless of whether the children had extraordinary emotional
court erred by not reviewing the
needs) .25
Thus, the supreme
254
factual findings on this point.

E.

Balancing the Act's Goals

The Act has two goals: (1) protecting the best interests of Indian
children; and (2) promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families. 255 State courts should make every effort to achieve both
of these goals in proceedings involving the placement of Indian
children. In certain circumstances, such as those presented by In re the
Custody of S.E.G., realizing both goals simultaneously is difficult, if not
In such cases, courts should ensure that individual
impossible.
children's interests are examined with extreme care. As the court of
appeals stated, "the Act does not change the cardinal rule that the best
interests of the child are paramount. "256
The good cause exception to the Act's placement preferences

provisions was designed to give courts the flexibility to make placement
decisions that are in the best interests of the children. 2 7 Such
decisions should be made even when the children's interests are
contrary to tribal interests in the short run. By opposing the adoption

253. It is a well-settled legal concept that if a court bases its decision on independent
factors, and at least one of those factors is supported by the record, the appellate court
should affirm the lower court's decision. For example, in a case from the 1950s the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
The trial court has placed decision on a number of grounds, some of which
are wholly unrelated, and, if any of these grounds are tenable, the judgment
should be affirmed. We shall accordingly consider separately each ground
upon which the trial court placed its decision.
Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 376, 71 N.W.2d 869, 873 (1955).
254. In addition, there is one other factor that the BIA Guidelines state in
establishing good cause: "[t] he request of the biological parents or the child when the
child is of sufficient age." See BIA Guidelines, supra note 124, at 67,594. The Act also
states that "[wlhere appropriate, the preference of the Indian child or parent shall be
considered." ICWA § 1915(c). The biological parents did not state a preference.
S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 880 n.3. However, the guardian ad litem testified that the
children expressed a desire to live with Petitioners. Id. Also, the oldest child's therapist
testified that "[the oldest child] hoped [Petitioners] would 'fight for her.'" S.E.G., 521
N.W.2d at 361. Nevertheless, the trial court made no findings of fact on this factor.
S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 880 n.3. Minnesota courts, applying state law, have considered
young children's preferences in custody proceedings. See, e.g., Mowers v. Mowers, 406
N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. CL App. 1987) (seven-year, ten-month old child); Peterson v.
Peterson, 394 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (eight-year old child).
255. ICWA § 1902.
256. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 880 (citing In re Interest of Bird Head, 331 N.W.2d 785,
791 (Neb. 1983)).
257. S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d at 878 (relying on the flexibility given to state courts to
determine good cause (1) to establish a standard of proof, and (2) to reject the
argument that complete deference should be given to the tribe's recommendations).
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in this case, the Band may even have been acting contrary to its
interests in the long run. The Band's active role in opposing the
adoption in spite of the children's best interests may have planted the
seed of resentment within the children. The fruits of this action may
be adults who are not willing to interact, or who at least minimize their
interaction with the Band.
This is not to say that courts should place Indian children in nonIndian homes whenever they feel like it. Maintaining Indian cultural
integrity is a worthy goal and a narrow construction of "good cause" is
an appropriate way to achieve this goal.
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court could have narrowly
construed "good cause" by limiting the types of situations where the
good cause exception would be allowed to those similar to this case.
That is, placement in a non-Indian home could be allowed in
situations where multiple failed placements have contributed to the
children's extraordinary emotional needs, and where there is an
unavailability of suitable Indian families for placement.
These
conditions meet two of the BIA Guidelines' three criteria for establishing a good cause exception to the Act's preferences: "The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child ... [and t]he unavailability of suitable families for placement after a diligent search has
been completed .
"..
25
Once good cause is established, an independent analysis should be
done that examines the proposed adoption in light of the statutory
definition of a child's best interests.25
The adoption should be
allowed only if both (1) good cause to deviate from the Act's preferences, and (2) the best interests of the child have been established. In
this way, courts would not have to risk future failed placements that are
contrary to the children's best interests. At the same time, the interests
of Indian tribes would continue to be protected in a meaningful way.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Indian Child Welfare Act is an important piece of legislation
which protects Indian tribal interests. The Act does this with an
emphasis on tribal integrity by seeking to keep Indian children
connected to their culture whenever possible."6 It also has the
stated goal of realizing the best interests of Indian children.2 6'
Usually, tribal interests and a child's best interests can be achieved

258. BIA Guidelines, supra note 124, at 67,584.
259. SeeMINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1994) (defining "best interests of the child");
see also supra note 42 (quoting the statute).
260. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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simultaneously by application of the Act's provisions. In some cases
though, a child's best interests may be inconsistent with the interests
of the tribe.
S.E.G. is one such case. The children in this case had extraordinary
emotional needs brought about by abuse, abandonment, and multiple
moves within the foster care system. Their needs could only be met by
a permanent, adoptive placement with a caring family. An adoptive
placement could not be achieved within the Act's provisions, which
require placement with an Indian family.26 2 This set of facts justified
the trial court's application of the "good cause" exception to the Act's
placement preference provisions. The trial court was correct in
awarding custody of the children to the white foster couple who had
petitioned the court. Similarly, the court of appeals was correct to
affirm.
The Minnesota Supreme Court ignored some of the trial court's
factual findings, misconstrued other facts, and reversed the lower
courts' decisions. By doing so, the high court made it practically
impossible for a non-Indian family to adopt an Indian child. This case
presented an extreme set of facts in which the children's well-being
and futures were at stake. The Act's goal of achieving the best
interests of the children should have been given more weight.
The Minnesota Supreme Court could have affirmed the decision to
award the white couple custody without significantly diminishing the
Act's tribal protection. By limiting its holding to the facts of this case,
future decisions under the Act's good cause exception would still need
to pass the stringent requirements of the BIA Guidelines and a proper
level of protection for tribal interests would be maintained.
Hassan Saffouri

262.

See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
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